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THE FREE PRESS AND A FAIR TRIAL
VERMONT ROYSTER*

It is no haphazard coincidence that the doctrines of freedom
of the press and of the right of an individual to an impartial trial
are joined together in those first ten amendments to the Constitution, known collectively as the Bill of Rights. Nor is it an accident that in neither the first nor the fourth amendment did the
drafters trouble to define freedom of the press, the form of a jury
trial or the nature of the impartiality which the jurors are to possess.
Freedom of the press and trial by jury were put cheek-by-jowl
because to the men of that time each was considered a means to a
single end, the protection of the citizens from arbitrary acts of
the authorities of the State. And to those men it seemed unnecessary to define the terms and concepts which, to them, held no
mystery. As the Supreme Court observed nearly seventy years ago,
"The law is perfectly well settled that the first ten amendments to
the Constitution, commonly known as the Bill of Rights, were not
intended to lay down any novel principles of government, but
simply to embody certain guaranties and immunities which we had
inherited from our English ancestors ....

1

In the deep reaches of the common law those principles were
not bred of abstract moral predilictions which, as Justice Holmes
has said, "must not be allowed to influence our minds in settling
legal distinctions,"' but rooted in harsh experience. Generations of
experience had shown convincingly that without both of these
guarantees-trial by jury and freedom of the press-no man was
safe once caught in the sovereign's toils. The principles, then,
were not philosophical but eminently practical.
Yet so short are men's memories that we are now in a time
when these two fundamental guarantees have come to be viewed
by many people, including many supposedly versed in the law, as
not only unrelated but even antagonistic and mutually irreconcilable.
*1 Editor, The Wall Street Journal.
Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281 (1897).
'HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 118 (Belknap Press ed. 1963).
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Thus the Warren Commission, reporting on the assassination
of President Kennedy, raised the question whether the attendant
publicity of those dreadful days would have made it impossible for
the accused assassin to have a "fair" trial, whether it did not in
fact make it difficult for the accused assassin of the assassin to have
such a fair trial. The same question has been raised by a number
of State Bar Associations and frequently discussed in the councils
of the American Bar Association.
The critical part of the question, to be sure, is not directed
solely at the press. A proposed amendment to Canon 5 would make
it "improper and professionally reprehensible" for a lawyer to
express pre-trial opinions on the evidence against an accused, and
the Morse bill3 now pending in Congress would make it a punishable
contempt of court for any one in federal jurisdiction, including the
accused himself, to "publish information not properly filed with the
court."

But whether the apparent target is the press or the Bar, the
assumption behind all such proposals is that any and all pre-trial
publicity is by nature a bad thing and ought to be proscribed in
order to preserve that "impartial trial" of the fourth amendment.
Since this debate-the Bar on one side and the press on the
other-has become so acrimonious, it might be well to pause a
moment for a look at the origin of both these principles of the Bill
of Rights; else there is a danger that in the forensics of the advocates we will lose sight of what lawyers call the crux of the case.
Doing so, it becomes apparent that freedom of the press is not a
"privilege" granted to editors, like the droit du seigneur or the
benefit of clergy, though critics of the press may speak of it in
those terms and some editors act as if it were. Nor are the defenses erected to preserve both free speech and free publishing intended as an absolute license to speak, or to print, anything without accountability.
Blackstone, that teacher of yesteryear who today is more honored
than read, stated the matter clearly, and it is apparent that what
he states is not a one-sided doctrine but a two-pronged concept.
He remarks in his Commentaries:
The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of the
free state; but this consists in laying no previous restraints upon
'S. 290, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
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publications, and not in freedom from censure from criminal
matter when published. Every freeman has an undoubted right
to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public: to forbid
this, is to destroy the freedom of the press: but if he publishes
what is improper, mischievous,4 or illegal, he must take the consequences of his own temerity.
Note, first of all, that the freedom belongs to "every freeman,"
not just to publishers of great newspapers; any man is entitled,
if he will, to hawk handbills crying impeachment of a Chief Justice.
Clearly, what belongs as a right to every man is a privilege of none,
and anything that abridges the right for any man-even a muddleheaded editor-abridges the right for all men.
Note also that included herein is the right to be mischievous
and improper insofar as what is said. The allegation, or even the
provable fact, that a certain man writes something that will be
mischievous in its effects, be it on a great matter of State or on a
county trial for poaching, is no ground for preventing the writer
from setting before the public his sentiments about the conduct
of Presidents or a county prosecutor.
But note especially that as Blackstone states the principle
there is no freedom from accountability for what is written or
said. If a man writes what injures another he has, in this view,
committed a tort, as surely as if he had stabbed him with a pikestaff. If what a man writes is destructive to the ends of society,
then society may afterwards bring him to task.
Such was the concept of freedom of the press to those who
drafted the first amendment; they felt no need to define their terms
for their minds had been suckled on Blackstone. A man was as free
to write as to walk down a public highway; but if in either case he
trampled a neighbor or disturbed the peace he should answer for it.
If today we have problems from "freedom of the press" they
derive not from holding to the first part of the doctrine but from
softening the second part. We do still have libel laws but they
are neither clear nor forceful; in the recent New York Times caseu
the Supreme Court all but abolished them as they apply to public
officials. In most jurisdictions the concept of an answerable tort
from the printed word has, for all practical purposes, been lost
entirely.
44 BLACXSTONE, CommENTAzIEs

*151-52.

New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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It will be heresy for an editor to say so, but a part of the present
problem about pre-trial publicity arises from this disappearance of
accountability. There is a valid complaint when newspapers in
pre-trial stories refer to the accused as the "burglar" or the "rapist"
before there is a conviction in court. Actually few newspapers do
this any longer; but all would abandon it quickly if the few which
do were brought to account by successful damage suits.
Nonetheless, in both law and logic the abuse of the thing must
not be confused with the thing abused. The Blackstone doctrine
found its way into our Constitution because experience taught that
the best safeguard against the tyranny of policemen, prosecutors
and judges was the right of outsiders-in practice, newspapersto put their actions under the glare of publicity at every stage. It
was the ability of people to know what was going on that diminished,
if it has not extinguished, the languishment of the un-tried in prison,
either through the casualness or the callousness of officials. Insofar
as it bears on the question of justice in the courtroom, the freedom
of the press to publicize events before, during and after a trial was
conceived as a handmaiden of those other guarantees, such as the
right of habeas corpus.
In short, we have freedom of the press for no other reason than
that men saw it as an instrument of justice-not as a privilege or a
matter of form, but as a means to an end of substance.
We have trial by jury for the same reason, and for none other.
As every lawyer surely knows, the present conception of a trial
as a presentation of evidence to a jury totally unfamiliar with the
case is of relatively recent origin. The forerunners of the modern
jury were the jurata of Norman times, men called in to help the
King's minister decide a case precisely because they were familiar
with the matters at issue; what today we might call "expert" advisers. The system has something to commend it in logic but it
proved susceptible to manipulation, particularly in criminal cases;
officers of the King's court rarely chose jurata unfriendly to the
King's side of the case. The substitute, slowly evolved, was the jury
of freemen chosen by lot.
Note here, however, that they were always freemen of the same
county; indeed, they are today in most jurisdictions. They were
locally chosen because local jurors would have some knowledge of
local affairs, perhaps of the background gossip of the case, and
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might even be help in reaching a just decision by virtue of their
knowledge of the people involved. Only in extreme cases was a
criminal trial put in the hands of total strangers in a distant court.
Moreover, the judges were-and in England still are-active
participants in the trial, not mere umpires between contending counsel; they helped the jury weigh the evidence as well as the law. In
sum, there is no antiquity in the modern idea that a jury should be
composed of people who come to court with minds blank as to
the case at hand, left to struggle as best they may without guidance
and dependent solely on the skill of advocates for the justice of their
verdict.
This modern idea that a jury should come into the courtroom
in total ignorance was an effort to remove prejudice from the
juror's mind; or, more accurately, to guard against prejudgment.
Whether this is sound in theory may be left to philosophers, although I can't forebear noting that the tendency to turn to blueribbon juries suggests that it is not wholly honored even in the
abstract. What is relevant to the present discussion is simply the
reminder that the form of a jury trial has been an evolving process.
The form--i.e., the use of the number 12, or the ignorance of the
jurors-is not the heart of the matter; what abides is the effort to
make the judicial process as just as human frailty will allow.
This is true of all legal procedures, though once being inducted
into their mysteries lawyers may easily forget it. The law has its
procedures not for their own sake but only as instruments to substantive principles. They thus stand on a par with such instruments
as freedom of the press-to be upheld where they are tested by
time, to be altered if they no longer serve in the real world in which
men live.
What has happened in the present controversy, I believe, is
that some members of the Bar have lost the substance in the form.
That is, they see pre-trial publicity as endangering the ignorance of
the jury when it is empanelled. If a juror has read about the case,
has read perhaps that the accused has a record of convictions, has
heard the prosecutor say the evidence against the accused is "overwhelming," and so on, then the juror may come prejudgment in
mind. So they conclude that the form-in this instance, an emptyminded jury-must be preserved at all costs.
The error here is three-fold. It misreads the law's history. It
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divorces the law from reality. And it ignores the injury to the
substance in the preservation of a form.
Consider, for example, the case of British law, so often cited
as an example we should follow. British law does put stringent
restrictions on pre-trial statements by both prosecution and defense
and pre-trial comments or reporting by newspapers. Yet the citation
looks at the form, not the substance. For one thing, in criminal
cases the British court system still honors the requirement in our
fourth amendment for a "speedy" trial; it is a rare thing indeed
for an accused to languish long untried. Equally importantly, every
step in the British criminal process is open to the public and the
press-arraignments and preliminary hearings as well as the trial
proper. The form may seem to be one of restriction; the substance,
which is full information for the public from beginning to end of
the judicial process, is jealously preserved.
The reality in this country, as any country lawyer can bear witness, is somewhat different. The law's delays, in criminal as in
civil matters, are interminable. It is not at all unusual for an accused to have no public hearing in his case until the actual trial,
which may be months-even years-after arrest. In a system that
so functions in actual practice, a ban upon all news, upon all comment, upon all statements even by the accused, would ring down a
total curtain of silence under which many unfortunate men would
be buried.
I, for one man, would shudder at the prospect of being charged
with some crime, especially one of moral turpitude, and being condemned to suffer silence until some distant day when even an acquital would not be recompense. And what I shudder at for myself
I would not wish upon any man. The history of the law means
nothing if it does not mean that each man should be treated as
we would be done by.
It may not be so in theory, but in the real world there are
policemen out to break all records in the number of arrests they
can make in a given period. There are prosecutors with the same
failing. There are officers who in a tense situation yield to the
temptation to arrest anyone for the sake of pacifying a public
aroused by a murder or a rape. There have been spite arrests.
There are, indeed, a hundred ways in which justice can be and sometimes is debauched by those whose job it is to serve it. Sometimes
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the damage is to the defendant. Sometimes it is to the community,
which, let us not forget, is also an interested party in any criminal
case.

For all these situations, where the substance of justice is involved and is sometimes lost in the forms, there is no better instrument than that every stage of the procedure, from commission of
the crime to the verdict of the jury, should be subject to public
scrutiny. In the obverse, the thing can be stated more bluntly. Deny
the right to such public scrutiny and in the real world there remains
no other instrument by which justice can be judged.
But what, then, of the form that the jury should be ignorant.
The abstraction itself is dubious, for pre-knowledge is not necessarily the same thing as prejudice; in every other walk of lifewithin the family, within business, within other groups-men are
often helped to more just decisions by some prior knowledge of
the dispute at hand. No matter. In the real world it is nonsense
for the Warren Commission or anyone else to imply that it would
be possible to have a President assassinated in such silence that
none should know the circumstance until he heard it in court. The
same is true of many lesser crimes in smaller communities than
the whole nation; what is of interest to the community, the community will talk about. The only difference is whether they read
about it in their newspapers, where there is at least some chance
of accuracy, or listen to gossip where anything can pass for truth
unchallenged.
None of this is intended to deny that pre-trial publicity can have
its ill effects. As there are misguided or venal editors, so are there
lawyers, police and judges. No defense is offered here of the policeman or prosecutor who announces that he has caught "the guilty
one," or labels the evidence as "conclusive" or otherwise so loads
his statements that he does the accused an injury that later vindicacation cannot assuage. No defense either of the editor who pillories
an accused or slanders those in authority for the sake of sheer
sensation or for the gratification of spite.
But for these things we are not without remedies, if we will but
seek them. As editors can be brought to account, so may policemen, lawyers and even judges. The American Bar Association, for
one simple deed, could enforce its existing Canons. It could bring
to account counsel who speak mischievously; it could lend its weight
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to recoverable actions against officials who do torts with their
tongues.
What the law should not do is to try to remedy one evil with a
greater one. Those who insisted that our Constitution was not
complete until freedom of the press and the guarantee of trial by
jury had been put side by side were not engaged in novel experiment. They were not enshrining abstract theory. They were recording the lessons of experience. The substance of what they
sought was as impartial a system of justice as could be devised, in
the hope-but not necessarily the certainty-that this would yield a
just decision between society and those accused of transgressions
against society.
Here the lesson experience, a thousand years of experience, was
that the judicial process must be open to inspection from its beginning to its end, to the purpose that all should lie under the public gaze
so that if error could not be obviated it could at least not be hidden.
One instrument for this was the open court with the accused and the
accusers openly confronted. Another instrument was the open press,
so that nothing could be hidden from first accusation to final judgment. The lesson of the common law was that the two were not
irreconcilable, they were mutually dependent.
And so they still are. Freedom of the press and the open trial
are both means to the end that citizens may judge the system which
judges them; they are the twin handmaidens that lead blind justice.
To dim one of them might not put all in darkness, but there would
surely be thereafter less light along the way.

